Σενάρια περί οικονομικής πολιτικής της προεδρίας Ομπάμα

Διάφοροι οικονομολόγοι/blogger, έχοντας προεξοφλήσει το γεγονός πως ο Ομπάμα θα είναι ο νικητής στις αυριανές εκλογές, έχουν ήδη αρχίσει να κυκλοφορούν πιθανά σενάρια για την μορφή της οικονομικής πολιτικής μιας προεδρίας Ομπάμα. Παραθέτω παρακάτω κάποια σημεία που βρίσκω ενδιαφέροντα…

Ο Greg Mankiw, με αφορμή την δήλωση του James Galbraith (υιού του γνωστού Galbraith) πως “οι περισσότεροι οικονομολόγοι διδάσκουν ένα θεωρητικό πλαίσιο που έχει αποδειχθεί θεμελιακά άχρηστο” και πως ο JG είναι οικονομικός σύμβουλος του Ομπάμα, επισημαίνει το ενδεχόμενο σοβαρής διαμάχης μεταξύ ετερόδοξων και ορθόδοξων οικονομολόγων κατά την διάρκεια της προεδρίας Ομπάμα. Ο Λευκός Οίκος για πρώτη φορά στην ιστορία θα αποτελέσει πεδίο μάχης μεταξύ ορθόδοξων και ετερόδοξων οικονομολόγων.

One of the more telling things to look out for in the coming weeks (assuming the seemingly inevitable Obama victory) will be which economists get which jobs in the new adminstration. Will the important positions be filled with people like Austan Goolsbee and Jason Furman, who are essentially mainstream economists with slightly left of center political views, or with heterodox economists like [James] Galbraith who are deeply skeptical of the economics found in most textbooks? If the administration is filled with prominent members of both groups, the internal battles over the heart and soul of the new adminstration’s economic policy should prove fascinating to watch.

Ο Matthew Kahn, ορμώμενος από πρόσφατο άρθο του Bob Shiller στους NYTimes που κατηγορεί τους οικονομολόγους για κονφορμισμό λόγω έλλειψης επαγγελματικών κινήτρων για την κατάρριψη του λεγόμενου ‘conventional wisdom’, γράφει πως τα behavioral economics θα κυριαρχήσουν κατά την προεδρία Obama – αλλά κρούει και τον κώδωνα του κινδύνου για το γεγονός πως οι πολιτικές προτάσεις που πηγάζουν από αυτή την οικονομική σχολή δεν αποτελούν πανάκεια:

Behavioral economics has received a boost from the wild asset price dynamics recently, it will receive another boost on Tuesday when President O begins to enact a series of “nudges” to achieve his well meaning goals for all of us. Hopefully, he will allow for some field experiments with well defined control groups to test whether benevolent paternalism is effective policy.
But, behavioral economists face at least one challenge.
Smart economic agents have an incentive to mask their true type (think of the Sith in Star Wars) during bad times and when bad shocks take place. “Gee, I was fooled by the asset’s sales rep. I didn’t read the fine print. I didn’t understand what an ARM loan really meant? I didn’t know that my credit card rates would soar.”
In a diverse world, there are certainly some percentage of people who this previous paragraph is the truth but there are others who are lying. The liars have an incentive to mask their type. Santa Claus knows who is naughty and nice but how will Schiller separate out these sets?
A giant moral hazard problem ensues that would not take place when if the government can commit to no bailout of anybody.
When an unknown fraction of the population cannot be trusted to make “good decisions” for themselves, what decisions do you allow all the people to make?
Will the behavioralists ex-ante limit the choice sets that we face? Or will they ex-post compensate “victims” (home owner foreclosure loan modifications).
People keep talking about “better regulation” but this raises political economy issues; who are these “better regulators”? Will the FBI be in charge of studying each mortgage’s terms and conditions?
Behavioral economists need to start a research program of identifying what % of the population are “behavioral”. I am assuming that these types are distributed across sexes, races, and ages so no explicit discrimination concerns arise. If neuro-economists can identify this group based on brain waves, will the Supreme Court allow the majority to vote for laws that limit their freedom for their own good and for everyone else’s? If Ivy League Schools have a causal effect on reducing one’s propensity to be “behavioral”, should we be subsidizing that treatment?

Φυσικά, αν μια ριζοσπαστική προεδρία Ομπάμα δεν είναι αρκετή για μεταβολή στην οικονομική πολιτική, η παρούσα οικονομική κρίση θα διορθώσει την κατάσταση πολύ γρήγορα μεταβάλοντας δραστικά το ίδιο το επάγγελμα των οικονομολόγων.

O Tyler Cowen γράφει:

I believe that demand for economics classes will rise, as it often does in economically troubled times. Some of this will be “shaman demand” rather than “knowledge demand.” The consulting incomes of finance economists will fall and fewer talented people will go into finance. Speaking fees will fall since fewer economists will give talks at hedge funds. The relative status of macroeconomists will rise and the relative status of microeconomists will fall. Economists will gain in fame and lose in income.

Ο Arnold Kling ανταπαντά:

I think that macroeconomics has suffered a crash. As recently as six months ago, the consensus was that it was sufficient for monetary policy to engage in inflation targeting or to follow a Taylor rule. Now, Brad DeLong refers to this view contemptuously as “Greenspanism.”
If you look closely, you will find that there is no consensus now. Olivier Blanchard’s triumphal history of the last thirty years of economics is exactly wrong.
What will emerge? What the public wants is a theory of control. That is, the demand is for a theory that includes ways for policymakers to control booms and busts. To satisfy that demand, my guess is that the economics profession will put most of its effort into rationalizing or tinkering with the consensus. The leaders of the profession have too much invested in New Keynesianism to be able to back away or acknowledge that it has been refuted.
I would not be surprised to see unorthodox theories of control gain traction. Perhaps, to justify current policy trends, a theory that socialized investment is necessary for stability.
To me, the logical thing for the economics profession to do is admit that we are nowhere near understanding what is happening. However, taking that position will not get you invited to panels.
I think that there are two questions. First, what are the generic causes and consequences of bubbles? Second, why did the specific bubble in real estate and mortgage finance occur? The first question is harder. But I would say that 99 percent of the economics profession cannot even correctly answer the second.

Μέχρι σήμερα πίστευα πως η προεδρία Obama θα αποτελούσε σίγουρα πλατφόρμα εφαρμογής για τις προτάσεις πολιτικής των behavioral economics (aka nudging). Τα παραπάνω σχόλια με οδηγούν στο συμπέρασμα πως ίσως βιώνουμε μια συγκυρία που θα ωθήσει την προεδρία Obama ακόμα και σε πολιτικές που προτείνονται από “ανορθόδοξες” σχολές οικονομικής σκέψης. Ο αγώνας τώρα δικαιώνεται;